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Our society generally views physicians and other medical personnel with 
respect. This respect is a result of not only their expertise in health issues but also 
the public’s faith that physicians and other medical personnel use their expertise 
in an ethical manner. “Medicine is, at its center, a moral enterprise grounded in a 
covenant of trust” (Crawshaw et al., 1995).
To understand the role of the team physician in either preventing athletes 
from using banned substances and/or disqualifying student-athletes (SAs) from 
participation, it is essential to appreciate the similarities and differences in the 
application of ethical principles between physicians in sports medicine and those 
in standard medical practice. For this article, the term sports medicine physician 
refers to a physician who assumes the role of the team physician (i.e., it does not 
include someone who practices sports medicine but has no ties to the athlete’s 
university). At the intercollegiate level, universities often employ team physi-
cians. A physician employed in the role of team physician at a university accepts 
responsibilities to the team and university that fundamentally alter the standard 
doctor–patient relationship. While balancing these potentially competing loyal-
ties, sports medicine physicians must seek to maintain the trust of SAs, the univer-
sities they work for, and society. Without trust, the sports medicine profession will 
lose power both as a confidant in the doctor–patient relationship and as a valued 
arbiter in intercollegiate sports.
Consider the following: A freshman football lineman comes in for his prepar-
ticipation sports physical and admits to using the new performance enhancing 
substance, “makemepro.” This substance is believed to enhance muscle strength. 
There have been several anecdotal reports of cerebrovascular accidents (i.e., 
strokes) in users of this substance. It is believed that episodes of temporary blind-
ness may be a warning sign for the drug-associated strokes. The drug is banned, 
but it is not detectable by current testing methods. The player informs you that he 
was a mediocre player before taking “makemepro.” Now he is a high school All-
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American and is coming to your university on a scholarship. Without the scholar-
ship, he would have no way of affording any school’s tuition and thus would not 
attend college. He informs you that since starting “makemepro,” he has short epi-
sodes in which he loses his vision, and he wonders whether these episodes are 
related to use of the drug. In addition, because he is certain that his performance 
on the football field is dependent on this drug, he tells you that there is no way that 
he will stop taking it. Knowing that the substance is banned, he asks that you do 
not tell the coach and administration. What do you do?
Given that universities entrust team physicians with preparticipation evalua-
tion and that the major objectives of these evaluations include screening for life-
threatening issues and meeting medico-legal requirements, it is apparent that this 
physician cannot clear the athlete. Were the SA to suffer a stroke, the school could 
be at enormous financial risk. In addition, because the substance is “banned,” the 
athlete’s use of it could put the team’s athletic standing in jeopardy. Were the phy-
sician in the private community, he or she could inform the athlete that clearance 
for participation cannot be granted, and further details could be handled in a con-
fidential discussion between the doctor and the athlete, a competent adult (this 
pertains to college athletes, who are nearly always over 18 years of age). However, 
given that the school has entrusted this particular physician to protect its interests, 
it is incumbent on the physician to inform the SA that he cannot keep this infor-
mation confidential.
Nonmedical personnel should understand that refusing to keep this informa-
tion confidential contradicts a basic principle of classic medical ethics: patient 
autonomy. A fundamental element of the standard doctor–patient relationship is 
the ability of competent adults to make their own autonomous health care deci-
sions (i.e., patient autonomy). The bioethical principle of patient autonomy under-
lies much of the standard of care for issues involving patient confidentiality, 
patient choice, and informed consent (Beauchamp & Walters, 1994). In the classic 
doctor–patient relationship, the physician in the example would refuse the athlete 
clearance for full participation because the athlete has admitted to something that 
is potentially life threatening). The physician would not be expected to go against 
the wishes of the SA and call the school to inform them that the SA is using a 
banned substance. Indeed, physicians may only breach confidentiality in rare 
instances such as mandatory reporting laws (e.g., in cases of suspected child 
abuse) or imminent danger. There is no exception to confidentiality for communi-
ty-based adult patients who cheat or take risks.
Whenever possible, community physicians should avoid serving in the role of 
law enforcement. For those who disagree, assume that you had a patient who 
informed you that over the past few months he had twice driven his car home from 
a bar while under the influence of alcohol, but he did not want you to tell his 
spouse or the police. It is fair to say that most physicians would keep this informa-
tion private, perhaps choosing to counsel the patient on the hazards of drunk driv-
ing with the hope of preventing further episodes. Now, assume that the risk for a 
“makemepro”-induced stroke is lower than the risk of serious injury from drunk 
driving. Why couldn’t an adult (i.e., the athlete) make a choice that gives him what 
he views as a benefit (in this case more strength, a college scholarship, and the 
chance to become a rich professional athlete) and accept the risks involved? Fol-
lowing the same logic as that for a patient who admits to occasionally driving 
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under the influence of alcohol (where the risk/benefit ratio is much higher, espe-
cially given the lack of any large benefits), it follows that a physician would then 
counsel and follow the patient.
However, because of sports medicine providers’ competing loyalties (again, 
where the physician is acting on behalf of a university or a governing body), the 
scope of patient autonomy is not nearly so broad. This highlights a major differ-
ence in the application of bioethical principles to typical medicine as compared 
with sports medicine. When a sports medicine physician is fulfilling an official 
role for a university (as in the case of high-level intercollegiate athletics), that 
physician has responsibilities to both the athletes and the school. In the case 
above, the physician’s responsibility to the school calls for him or her to inform 
the student that the information cannot be kept confidential for the reasons out-
lined above. As suggested by Bernstein, Perlis, and Bartolozzi (2004), if an athlete 
reveals past medical history pertinent to his or her ability to safely participate, 
then irrespective of the athlete’s wishes, the physician may and sometimes must 
break confidentiality by informing the team or school administration.
So, how does a sports medicine physician maintain the trust of SAs given the 
possibility of the “makemepro” scenario and others like it? Preparation and dis-
closure. As much as possible, before an SA’s first encounter with the medical staff, 
physicians should disclose to SAs that because of obligations to the team and 
university, team physicians cannot guarantee confidentiality at all times. By 
informing SAs in advance that, unlike a standard physician–patient relationship, 
confidentiality might not be guaranteed, the physician discloses his or her obliga-
tions and minimizes the dilemma. (Pearsall, Kovaleski, & Madanagopal, 2005; 
Waddington & Roderick, 2002). If the SA has an established relationship with a 
hometown doctor, then it is often advisable to keep this relationship going in the 
event of the SA wanting to be more certain of confidentiality. After expressing an 
understanding of this, the SA can decide whether to tell the team physician certain 
pieces of information.
Critics of this approach might argue that such warnings might ultimately 
prove dangerous for athletes. That is, telling athletes that information might be 
forwarded to the coach or University could result in the dangerous underdisclo-
sure of pertinent medical history. For example, many athletes might be reluctant 
to reveal a history of concussions if aware that it could bar them from competing. 
Not knowing which facts might be revealed to the coach, athletes could withhold 
sensitive or embarrassing information that might be very relevant to their general 
health.
Acknowledging this tradeoff, it is important to understand the role of trust in 
any doctor–patient relationship. Respect for SAs as persons supercedes the risks 
of underdisclosure and ultimately supports a trusting physician–athlete relation-
ship. Unexpectedly breaking patient/athlete confidentiality can be most unprofes-
sional and so damaging to the physician–athlete relationship, and subsequently to 
the physician–team relationship, that professionalism demands setting clear 
expectations. To prevent underdisclosure in other clinical settings it is important 
to explain that this limit of confidentiality is unique to the role of the physician 
covering the team and does not extend into the athlete’s private clinical 
encounters.
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Patient autonomy is also limited in the sports medicine setting as a result of 
limits on patient choice. As discussed by Prof. Mitten, the case of Knapp v. North-
western highlights this issue. Mr. Knapp accepted the risk of playing basketball 
given his cardiac condition. Although there were some medical experts who deter-
mined that the risks of participation were acceptable, the team physicians felt 
otherwise. The uncomfortable situation of prohibiting a SA from participating is 
within the jurisdiction of anyone who assumes the role of a university team physi-
cian. If a SA has a sign or symptom that the physician deems to pose an excessive 
risk to the university, then that physician has a duty to prevent the SA from partici-
pating. Whether the SA has a “right” to play college sports is a legal and philo-
sophical question. From a medical standpoint, the physician must use his or her 
own judgment as a representative of the university. As protectors of the University, 
the team physicians had the right to deny Mr. Knapp the ability to play basketball 
at Northwestern. This does not mean that physicians need to prohibit athletes 
from playing on a frequent basis. On the contrary, the role of the sports medicine 
physician can be viewed as one that seeks to allow safe participation.
On a much more mundane level, the difference in the scope of patient choice 
between sports medicine and more typical medicine is played out on a regular 
basis. Imagine that a community physician sees a 20-year-old female patient with 
a tibial stress fracture, and the physician recommends no running until a reassess-
ment in three weeks. The SA returns in 3 weeks with continued pain and the 
physician learns that she had been running long distances on a daily basis against 
medical advice. The physician would document this and inform the SA of the risk 
of continuing to run on a stress fracture. Beyond that, the physician would not be 
expected to inform others or take any extra means to limit the choice of a compe-
tent adult.
Now, imagine that this same patient was a scholarship cross-country runner 
at a university, and she was seeing the team physician. Here, we once again see the 
more limited role of confidentiality, because the team physician has the right and 
responsibility to discuss this issue with her coaches and other athletic staff person-
nel. This could lead to steps that would limit the SA’s options for running, or at a 
minimum, add further downsides to the choice of continued running (e.g., loss of 
scholarship). The SA has a choice as to whether to be on the team. If she chooses 
to be on the team, she accepts the rules of the team. One of these rules might be to 
follow medical advice.
Although the issues of confidentiality and patient choice limit the amount of 
patient autonomy in university-related sports medicine encounters, the issue of 
informed consent must not. Here, sports medicine physicians must uphold the 
same standards of consent as their community counterparts. The necessary condi-
tions for legitimate, informed consent in the field of medicine (including sports 
medicine) are as follows:
•  Disclosure: All relevant information that a reasonable person in this player’s 
position would want to know regarding the proposed treatment, nontreat-
ment, and alternative treatments must be explained to the player in an appro-
priate fashion.
•  Capacity: Players must have the capacity to understand this information and 
appreciate how it applies to them. “Competency” is the legal system’s equiva-
lent to the medical term “capacity.”
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•  Voluntariness: Within a noncoercive environment, the player must volun-
tarily express his or her wishes regarding the proposed options.
Certainly the issue of coercion, given the pressures upon any member of a 
team to conform, poses a potential challenge to fulfilling the condition of volun-
tariness. Still, maintaining these standards as close to ideal as possible is smart not 
only medically but also legally. Proper informed consent forms the basis of the 
best medical–legal defense for the sports medicine physician. Athletes are con-
stantly making judgments that could hamper their long-term health, and the physi-
cian covering the team is often involved in those decisions.
What about the harm that athletics itself causes the body? There is a strong 
medical argument that playing football while carrying excessive weight on inter-
nally deranged knees accelerates osteoarthritis. Why is it appropriate that physi-
cians allow athletes to damage their bodies through sports participation but not 
through the use of banned substances? The risks associated with the sports them-
selves are assumed to be known and accepted by the athlete. When athletes are 
brought into a sports medicine encounter (e.g., with an injury), it is important that 
the physicians inform the athletes of the risk of further play (beyond the baseline 
risks of the sport) and allow the athlete to decide. The fact that team physicians are 
not successfully sued more often is based partly on the fact that the adult athlete 
was appropriately informed of, understood, and voluntarily accepted these medi-
cal risks. Unlike the issue of confidentiality, the scope of informed consent is 
similar in the ethics of sports medicine and the ethics of typical medicine. It is 
essential that sports medicine physicians resist any temptation to deviate from the 
standards of informed consent as it is routinely practiced.
The issue of the sports medicine physician’s role in athletes’ use of 
performance-enhancing substances also involves the ethics of patient autonomy. 
Sports medicine physicians must be diligent in avoiding the active dispensation or 
encouragement of banned substances. Here, the application of ethical principles 
are generally similar to the those in regular medical practice. Respecting patient 
autonomy means respecting the choices the patient makes, not necessarily 
facilitating anything they want to do.
Imagine that a SA came with his coach (for the sake of drama, make it the 
new football coach who recently signed a multimillion dollar contract and is gen-
erally hailed as the answer to all of the school’s problems) and asked a physician 
to assist them in obtaining “makemepro.” The physician would not be expected to 
assist in obtaining this banned drug. The exact criteria that makes one substance 
banned and another an accepted performance-enhancing substance is a matter of 
debate and not a focus of this manuscript. Disregarding the issue of whether the 
substance is banned, the situation is similar to other situations physicians fre-
quently encounter in which an adult requests something for a quality-of-life ben-
efit that might carry hazardous side effects. Here the crucial issue is that the sub-
stance is banned, and not that it carries some risk.
Consider the issue of medications for erectile dysfunction. These carry rare 
but serious side effects. Yet, they are commonly prescribed because adult patients 
consider the benefits to outweigh the risks. With SAs and the drugs for enhanced 
performance (athletic performance, that is), the issue is that the substances are 
banned and thus all physicians (i.e., the team physician or a community physi-
cian) must avoid ever knowingly providing any SA with a banned performance-
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enhancing substance (in this case, “makemepro”). Given the frequency with 
which the rules of banned substances change and the lack of regulation regarding 
supplements, physicians are wise to try to avoid directly prescribing or encourag-
ing use of any substances that claim to enhance performance.
Note that in this latter example, there is a possibility that a physician working 
for a team might have a motive that makes the team physician, in fact, more likely 
than the community physician to assist the athlete with obtaining the drug. This 
might be the case if the physician valued his or her team physician role ahead of 
his or her societal role as a beholder for the integrity of sports. Although hoping 
that one’s team wins is a natural response to a game, when physicians become 
fans, investors, or simply rest their pride on serving as team physicians, they can 
lose the impartiality necessary for optimal judgment. Emotional ties to teams gain 
appeal as the level of competition rises from high school through college and to 
the professional level (Polsky, 1998). Athletic department administrators and 
coaches must avoid asking their team physicians to act in ways that might com-
promise the physician’s role as a source of public trust, and beware of physicians 
who have a reputation of breeching their ethical responsibilities.
In summary, to understand the issues that sports medicine physicians face 
when banning SAs from participation and/or discouraging pharmaceutical perfor-
mance enhancement, one must look beyond the conventional clinical-ethics litera-
ture. It is important to understand the similarities and differences in the applica-
tion of ethical principles to sports medicine as compared with regular medical 
practice. The two are similar in the need to fully inform SAs of their treatment 
options. Differences arise because physicians are responsible not only to their 
patients (here, the SAs) but also to the university. Consequently, patient autonomy 
might be limited in some respects as a result of the organizational structure sur-
rounding the physician–SA relationship. The scope of patient confidentiality and 
the freedom with which patients may choose to go against medical advice are 
more limited within this relationship. SAs and universities need to understand the 
competing loyalties facing physicians in sports medicine settings. Sports medi-
cine physicians need to engage in ethical behavior that garners respect. The key is 
to maintain the trust of both the SAs and the universities and, consequently, the 
trust of the society-at-large. In this manner sports medicine physicians can main-
tain their esteemed role, and SAs can continue to reap the benefits of safe partici-
pation in intercollegiate sports.
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